

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

NSC-05 /092 W

----- 127313

R 261504Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3030

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 6464

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM,UR,US

SUBJ: ISRAELYAN ON CTB

REF: STATE 95642

1. SUMMARY. WHEN I ASKED MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
DEVISION HEAD ISRAELYAN APRIL 26 WHETHER GROMYKO'S
SUGGESTION APRIL 12 THAT THE U.S. AND USSR DISCUSS
CTB REPRESENTED A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS SOVIET
POSITIONS, HE REPLIED:

--THAT IS WAS HIS IMPRESSION GROMYKO HAD IN MIND
INITIAL TALKS AMONG THE THREE DEPOSITORY STATES OF THE
MOSCOW TREATY, THE USSR, U.S. AND UK, WHICH WOULD NOT
EXCLUDE SUBSEQUENT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER NUCLEAR
WEAPONS STATES;

--THAT THE MAIN POINT WAS TO MOVE THE CTB IDEA FORWARD,
FOLLOWING ITS IDENTIFICATION AT THE 25TH SOVIET PARTY
CONGRESS AS A MAIN TASK;

--THAT THE 1974 SOVIET SUGGESTION OF BILATERAL TALKS
REMAINED ON THE TABLE, AS BREZHNEV HAD NOTED IN WARSAW
ON JULY 21, 1974;

-- THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RESORTED TO THE UN ONLY AFTER
THE U.S. HAD NOT ASSENTED TO MORE LIMITED TALKS AND
WOULD CONINUE TO PRESS THEIR CTB INITIATIVE IN THE
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UN, THOUGH HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE AD HOC

COMMITTEE;

--THAT THE 1975 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE HAD HIGHLIGHTED
NON-ALIGNED CRITICISM OF BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR FOR
LACK OF FURTHER PROGRESS;
--THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
VERIFICATION PROBLEM, SEE SOME MERIT IN THE PRECEDENTS
PROVIDED BY THE WAY IT WAS HANDLED IN THE BW AND
SEABED AGREEMENTS, BUT ARE NOT RIGID. HE DID NOT
RESPOND WHEN I NOTED I UNDERSTOOD THE CTB VERIFICATION
PROBLEM TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE RATHER NARROW BAND
OF EXPLOSIONS OF 20 KT AND BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING MY APRIL 26 CALL ON MFA INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION HEAD ISRAELYAN, THE FOLLOWING
EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE ON CTB.

3. I INTRODUCED THE TOPIC BY NOTING THAT AS I HAD
UNDERSTOOD HIM IN OUR APRIL 12 TALK, FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES
REACHING SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT ON CTB. AS I RECALLED
IT, HE HAD SAID THAT PERHAPS OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STATES MIGHT NOT BE PREPARED AT THE OUTSET TO JOIN
IN, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO AGREE. SINCE THIS
SEEMED TO DEPART SOMEWHAT FROM THE PREVIOUS SOVIET
POSITION THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PARTICIPATE IN BRING-
ING A CTB INTO FORCE, I SAID I WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY COMMENT ISRAELYAN WOULD CARE TO MAKE
ON THE SUBJECT.

4. ISRAELYAN (WHO SEEMED WELL-PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER
REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A CERTAIN
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SUGGESTED
THE POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A CTBT TO
THE U.S. IN MAY 1974 AT THE SUMMIT. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THE
AMERICAN SIDE HAD RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT READY. SUBSEQUENTLY,
BREZHNEV HAD ALLUDED TO THIS EXCHANGE ON JULY 21, 1974,
IN WARSAW, IN CONNECTION WITH THE POLISH NATIONAL
HOLIDAY. (LATER HE CALLED FOR AND READ THE APPROPRIATED
PASSAGE FROM BREZHNEV'S SPEECH. REFERRING TO THE
RECENT TTBS AGREEMENT, BREZHNEV HAD SAID WE WANT TO GO
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EVEN FURTHER AND ARE READY TO GO FURTHER; IN PARTICULAR,
THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO CONCLUDE A CTBT AGREEMENT;
IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS
MATTER, BUT GIVING LIFE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD
BE A NEW CONTRIBUTION WHICH WOULD BE GENERALLY WELCOMED,
AND, ISRAELYAN CONTINUED, BREZHNEV HAD CONCLUDED
"WE HOPE THE TIME WILL COME WHEN AGREEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE.")

5. THEN, ISRAELYAN WENT ON, MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN GENEVA IN 1974, WHERE BOTH SIDES WERE CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF FURTHER PROGRESS, THE SOVIETS DECIDED TO PUSH THE MATTER FORWARD WITH A NEW UN PROPOSAL. THE RESULT WAS THEIR UNGA RESOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE U.S. WAS STILL NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNGA RESOLUTION 347A.

6. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW SEEKING NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING THIS MATTER ALONG, ISRAELYAN CONTINUED. BREZHNEV HAD NAMED THIS AS A MAJOR TASK AT THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. CONCERNING GROMYKO'S SUGGESTION, ISRAELYAN UNDERSTOOD ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT HE HAD SEEN THAT GROMYKO HAS RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING THE IDEA FORWARD AMONG THE THREE DEPOSITORY STATES OF THE MOSCOW TREATY, THE USSR, THE U.S., AND THE UK.

7. AS BREZHNEV HAD SAID, THE PROPOSAL MADE IN 1974 STANDS. HIS PRIVATE OPINION, ISRAELYAN NOTED, WAS THAT IF THE U.S. IS INTERESTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO START CTBT NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. AND THE BRITISH, HAVING IN MIND THAT THEY COULD BE JOINED LATER BY OTHERS. THE QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW THIS COULD BE DONE REMAINED, BUT AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT THE MINISTER WAS NOT EXCLUDING THIS POSSIBILITY, MERELY SUGGESTING BEGINNING WITH THE MOSCOW TREATY DEPOSITORIES AS A FIRST STEP. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT TO LEAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING FORWARD OPEN FOREVER.

8. I INTERJECTED THAT I HAD UNDERSTOOD THE MINISTER
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TO SAY THAT OTHERS MIGHT AT SOME TIME SEE THE ADVISABILITY OF PARTICIPATING. ISRAELYAN MERELY REITERATED THAT THE CTBT HAD BEEN NAMED AS ONE OF THE FIRST ARMS CONTROL TALKS AT THE 25TH CONGRESS. IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, HE SAID, I SEE A REAL POSSIBILITY OF FORWARD MOVEMENT. HE WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS IN THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE, HE SAID. THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN THEIR NEW PROPOSAL TO THE 30TH UNGA WITHOUT ILLUSIONS ABOUT

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

NSC-05 /092 W

----- 125385

R 261504Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3031

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 6464

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE CHINESE "OR EVEN" THE FRENCH, AFTER NOT SUCCEEDING IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE U.S. IN 1974. THEY WOULD CONTINUE THEIR INITIATIVE IN THE UN, HOWEVER; FRANKLY, THEY WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MOOD IN THE UN, WHERE THE WORLD MAJORITY SUPPORTS THE INITIATIVE. BUT, SINCE THE PARTY CONGRESS HAD IDENTIFIED CTBT AS A TASK TO BE IMPLEMENTED, THEY WERE THINKING OF WAYS TO MOVE IT PRACTICALLY, AND ONE OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE GENEVA REVIEW CONFERENCE WAS THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE, AND THE NON-ALIGNED STATES WERE CRITICIZING BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. THUS, THE SOVIETS ARE READY, HE CONCLUDED, ON CONDITION THAT OTHER NUCLEAR NATIONS ARE TOO.

9. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT, AS HE KNEW AND I HAD TOLD GROMYKO, VERIFICATION REMAINED A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM FOR US, ISRAELYAN ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED THE DOCUMENT ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION SUBMITTED BY THE SWEDES IN THE CCD. WHEN I REPLIED THAT WE HAD A REPORT, BUT NOT THE DOCUMENT, HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE IT EITHER, BUT THAT IT MIGHT BE A VERY IMPORTANT DOCUMENT, WHICH SHOULD BE STUDIED AND MIGHT HELP TO MOVE VERIFICATION MATTERS FORWARD.

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10. WHEN I RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SENT EXPERTS TO THE CCD VERIFICATION MEETING, ISRAELYAN SAID THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WAS TO DISCUSS A DRAFT TABLED BY THE USSR, AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT FAVOR PARALLEL WORK IN SEVERAL FORA. HOWEVER, THE FACT THEY HAD NOT SENT EXPERTS DID NOT MEAN THEY NEVER WOULD. THE MAIN IDEA HE WISHED TO CONVEY WAS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN IMPLEMENTING IN CTBT CONCEPT IN GENERAL. THERE CAN BE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO A CTBT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERES; GROMYKO WAS EXPRESSING ONE IDEA FOR HELPING TO REACH THIS GOAL.

11. WHEN I ASKED AGAIN ABOUT VERIFICATION, ISRAELYAN REPLIED THAT OUR PNE EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT IT GOOD WILL IS THERE MUCH IS POSSIBLE. CERTAIN TREATIES, FOREXAMPLE ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS ON THE SEABED, ESTABLISH VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY AT LEAST TO THE SOVIETS, AND THESE PRACTICES MIGHT BE USED AGAIN. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET APPROACH IS NOT RIGID; VERIFICATION IS CERTAINLY A PROBLEM TO BE DISCUSSED.

12. I NOTED THAT AS I UNDERSTOOD IT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO CTB WAS CONCENTERATED IN THE AREA OF BLASTS OF 20 KT RT 20 KT AND BELOW, WHERE THERE WAS A REAL DANGER OF CONFUSION WITH EARTHQUAKES AND OTHER SEISMIC EVENTS. THUS, THE PROBLEM BAND WAS NOT EXCESSIVELY WIDE.

13. ISRELYAN RESPONDED ONLY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A RESPONSE, AND ESPECIALLY A POSITIVE RESPONSE, CONCERNING ITS SUGGESTION. I PROMISED TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION TO WASHINGTON. STOESSEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CTB, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW06464
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760158-0587
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760422/aaaaasqg.tel
Line Count: 258
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: 76 STATE 95642
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <30 AUG 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ISRAELYAN ON CTB
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006